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The Right to Privacy?
Andrew Koppelman
Laws that discriminate against gay people discriminate on
the basis of sex. If Lucy may marry Fred, but Ricky may not
marry Fred, then (assuming that Fred would be a desirable
spouse for either) Ricky is suffering legal disadvantage because of
his sex. Moreover, such laws depend on and reinforce the subor-
dination of women. I have argued for years that this is the princi-
pal constitutional defect with such laws.1 I have not, however,
said very much about the comparative part of this claim, and in-
stead have emphasized the strengths of the sex discrimination
argument.
The conventional wisdom, on the other hand, is that the
appropriate starting point for any discussion of the legal rights of
gay people is the idea that certain private matters are none of the
law's business.! Certainly this has been, for a long time, the most
commonly made argument for the legal equality of gay people.
This argument must contend with the contrary precedent of Bow-
Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, Northwestern University. This
article is an abridged version of Chapter Two of The Gay Rights Question in Contemporary
American Law (Chicago 2002), with new material added in response to Richard Epstein's
critique. It appears here with the permission of the University of Chicago Press. Many
thanks to Richard Epstein, my favorite sparring partner.
' See Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian
and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L Rev 519 (2001); Andrew Koppel-
man, The Miscegenation Analogy in Europe, or Lisa Grant Meets Adolf Hitler, in Robert
Wintemute and Mads Andenaes, eds, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships: A
Study of National, European and International Law (Hart 2001); Andrew Koppelman,
Why Gay Legal History Matters, 113 Harv L Rev 2035 (2000); Andrew Koppelman, Three
Arguments for Gay Rights, 95 Mich L Rev 1636, 1661-66 (1997); Andrew Koppelman,
Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality 146-76 (Yale 1996); Andrew Koppelman,
Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 NYU L Rev
197 (1994); Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex
Discrimination, 98 Yale L J 145 (1988).
2 This way of putting it dates back to the 1957 report of the Wolfenden Committee,
which reconsidered the law of sexual crimes in England. The committee concluded that
private consensual homosexual acts should be decriminalized, because "[t]here must re-
main a realm of private morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not
the law's business." Quoted in H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality 14-15 (Stanford
1963).
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ers v Hardwick,3 which held that the constitutional right of pri-
vacy does not protect consensual homosexual sex committed
within a person's home.' This is not an insuperable obstacle, how-
ever, because the overwhelming majority of commentators think
that Hardwick was wrongly decided.!
Privacy, however, is a weak constitutional basis for gay rights
claims. Gays' privacy claims cannot be deduced from earlier pri-
vacy decisions. The privacy doctrine inappropriately requires
judges to decide what is important in life. It excessively disables
the state from legislating on the basis of morality. Moreover, pri-
vacy is a poor characterization of what is at stake in the gay
rights debate, which turns primarily on achieving parity of public
status rather than private conduct. The argument has great rhe-
torical power, of course, and has produced notable successes in
litigation.! It would be foolish for advocates not to deploy it. But
its weaknesses suggest that even they should not place too many
of their eggs in this basket. And courts can always consider better
arguments.
Judge Robert Bork is the most prominent and persistent
critic of the right to privacy. I will not here consider his best-
known criticism, which is that the right does not exist because it
has no basis in the Constitution.7 Far more devastating is his
claim that the right is indeterminate, so that there is no way to
know what liberties are or are not protected. As a Court of Ap-
peals judge, Bork observed that the privacy cases "contain little
guidance for lower courts."' For example, Bork maintained that
Griswold v Connecticut,' which held that married couples had a
right to use contraceptives, "did not indicate what other activities
might be protected by the new right of privacy and did not pro-
478 US 186 (1986).
Id at 189.
For two somewhat overlapping lists of such commentators, see David J. Garrow,
Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and the Making of Roe v. Wade 902 n 97
(MacMillan 1994), and Earl M. Maltz, The Court, the Academy, and the Constitution: A
Comment on Bowers v. Hardwick and Its Critics, 1989 BYU L Rev 59, 60 n 4.
6 See Powell v State, 510 SE 2d 18 (Ga 1998); Gryczan v State, 942 P2d 112 (Mont
1997); Campbell v Sundquist, 926 SW 2d 250 (Tenn App 1996); Commonwealth v Wasson,
842 SW 2d 487 (Ky 1992); Post v State, 715 P2d 1105 (Okla Crim App 1986); People v
Onofre, 415 NE 2d 936 (NY 1980); Commonwealth v Bonadio, 415 A2d 47 (Pa 1980); State
v Pilcher, 242 NW 2d 348 (Iowa 1976); National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v
Minister of Justice, 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (South Africa Constitutional Court).See Robert Bork, The Tempting of America 95-100 (Free 1990).
" Dronenburg v Zech, 741 F2d 1388, 1392 (D C Cir 1984) (Bork) (upholding Navy's
policy of mandatory discharge for homosexual conduct).
9 381 US 479 (1965).
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vide any guidance for reasoning about future claims laid under
that right."'° The same critique applies to explicit privacy protec-
tions in state constitutions: What do they mean?
Some constitutional interpreters have argued that the solu-
tion to this indeterminacy problem is to define privacy rights as
broadly as possible." Bork has, however, correctly observed that
one cannot, as a practical matter, abstract all the way to a gen-
eral right to freedom, since some legal constraints on freedom
must exist.1
2
John Stuart Mill provided an obvious candidate for a limiting
principle with his dictum that
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exer-
cised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant."
10 Id.
" See, for example, Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U Chi L Rev 317
(1992).
12 Robert Bork, The Tempting of America 99-100. (cited in note 7). Laurence Tribe
and Michael Dorf concede that the choice of the level of abstraction at which to read the
Constitution's liberty clauses is "a choice that neither the Constitution's text nor its struc-
ture nor its history can make for us." Laurence H. Tribe and Michael C. Dorf, On Reading
the Constitution 116 (Harvard 1991). But then, none of these sources prevent the Court
from reaching the result that it does in Hardwick. At one point, Tribe and Dorf's treat-
ment of the privacy issue attempts to cut through this knot by entertaining the possibility
of maximal abstraction:
[Niothing in the Constitution's text remotely forecloses the argument that
unconventional sexual behavior is a fundamental right.
If we are to take seriously the Ninth Amendment's requirement that
"[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people," at a minimum
we must consider the possibility that rights which are consistent with the
enumerated rights-as a right to choose unconventional sexual behavior
is, and as a 'right" to engage in theft surely is not-may be required by
the Constitution.
Id at 110. This argument would appear to leave little for a legislature to do, since once it
had prohibited conduct violative of constitutional rights such as the right to property, it
would not be permitted to prohibit any other conduct. The set of constitutionally protected
activities would be pretty large; examples that come to mind include the right to grow
wheat on your farm without federal interference, the right to discharge pollutants into the
atmosphere, and the right to fornicate and defecate in public. None of these rights seems
inconsistent with any of the enumerated rights.
13 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 68 (Penguin 1974) (Gertrude Himmelfarb, ed).
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Mill's principle has been cited by some state courts when inter-
preting their constitutions to vindicate claims like Hardwick's."
Mill's essay is a great work of political theory, and it has always
been appealing to those friendly to gay rights, but his line would
secure liberty for gays at far too high a price. Social Security
would have to be abolished; prescriptions could no longer be re-
quired for powerful drugs; cocaine would have to be legalized, and
the formidable persuasive resources of modern advertising per-
mitted to be mobilized on that substance's behalf. (Imagine what
Joe Camel could do with those enormous nostrils.)15
Mill's principle would also constitutionalize a highly contro-
versial theory of the meaning of life, one that holds that the most
fundamental task of a human being is that of self-definition. It is
doubtful whether it is appropriate for the Court to read such a
culturally specific philosophy into the Constitution.
And, once again, look at how little Mill's principle accom-
plishes. Even if private sex acts between consenting adults are
not properly within the reach of the criminal law, this falls far
short of equality for gays. The principle is entirely consistent with
pervasive discrimination. One can coherently think that certain
sexual conduct is immoral and that the state should denounce
citizens who engage in it, even though such conduct, when pri-
vate and between consenting adults, is outside the state's legiti-
mate criminal jurisdiction.1 6 (And even this defense of privacy is a
fragile one, since it is doubtful whether there can be a fundamen-
tal right to do wrong.)"
" See Commonwealth v Bonadio, 415 A2d 47, 50 (Pa 1980) (holding regulation of
private conduct by consenting adults unconstitutional); Commonwealth v Wasson, 842 SW
2d 487, 496 (Ky 1992) (holding statute prohibiting deviate sexual intercourse to violate
state constitution's guarantee of privacy).
16 This is not to dismis the very powerful arguments that have been made against
the present regime of drug prohibition. See, for example, Ethan A. Nadelmann, Thinking
Seriously About Alternatives to Drug Prohibition, 121 Daedalus 85 (Summer 1992); Steven
B. Duke and Albert C. Gross, America's Longest War: Rethinking Our Tragic Crusade
Against Drugs (Putnam 1993). It is simply to note that those arguments, to the extent that
they are persuasive, are not simple applications of Mill's principle. It may be that drug
prohibition is not worth its social costs, but that is not the same as saying that cocaine
dealers have a fundamental right to purvey (or consumers a fundamental right to pur-
chase) their wares, whatever the consequences.
'6 See, for example, Romer v Evans, 517 US 620, 644-45 (1996) (Scalia dissenting);
Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage,
1996 BYU L Rev 1, 58-62; John Finnis, Liberalism and Natural Law Theory, 45 Mercer L
Rev 687, 697-98 (1994).
17 See Robert P. George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality 110-
28 (Oxford 1993).
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Critics of Hardwick have tried to identify the more abstract
interests at stake in that case. Kendall Thomas has noted three
broad conceptions of the constitutional right to privacy in the case
law and commentary: zonal, relational, and decisional."
The zonal paradigm focuses on the constitutional significance
of the home, recognized in the text of the Third and Fourth
Amendments and in a number of the Court's decisions.'9 "The be-
havior for which Hardwick faces prosecution," Justice Blackmun
noted in his dissent, "occurred in his own home."2' This implicated
the Fourth Amendment's protection of "the right of the people to
be secure in their . ..houses." Blackmun concluded that "the
right of an individual to conduct intimate relationships in the
intimacy of his or her own home seems to me to be the heart of
the Constitution's protection of privacy. '
The scope of the zonal claim is unclear, however. Blackmun
plainly did not mean to say that any conduct engaged in at home
is protected. "The Court," Bork observes, "we may confidently pre-
dict[,] . . .is not going to throw constitutional protection around
heroin use or sexual acts with a consenting minor."2 Blackmun
did not explain how to distinguish protected from unprotected
conduct. Moreover, even if Blackmun had prevailed on this issue,
the result would be a very modest victory for gays. Much of what
is at stake in the gay rights issue is public equality and
recognition, not simply a right to conduct secret liaisons un-
disturbed by the law." Kendall Thomas notes that "'the closet' is
less a refuge than a prisonhouse."'
"8 Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 Colum L Rev 1431, 1443-48
(1992).
19 US Const, Amend III ("No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
law.") (emphasis added); US Constitution Amendment IV ("The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated. ..).
20 Hardwick, 478 US at 206 (Blackmun dissenting).
21 Id.
2' Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind L J
1, 7 (1971). For this reason, Gerard Bradley concludes that the zonal argument is a place-
holder for the decisional one. See Gerard V. Bradley, Remaking the Constitution: A Criti-
cal Reexamination of the Bowers v. Hardwick Dissent, 25 Wake Forest L Rev 501, 512-16
(1990).
0 See Carol Steiker, Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homo-
sexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 Harv L Rev 1285, 1288-92 (1985).
Thomas, 92 Colum L Rev at 1455 (cited in note 18).
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In contrast to the zonal paradigm, the relational paradigm
"focuses on persons rather than places."" It holds that certain as-
sociations are specially protected from state interference, because
of "the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling
the nature of their intimate associations with others."2'6 Here, too,
the boundaries of the relational paradigm are unclear. If all asso-
ciations were protected, then the prohibition of criminal conspir-
acy and solicitation would be unconstitutional. Evidently there is
some distinction between protected and unprotected associations,
but the doctrine does not make it clear where the boundary lies.
Hardwick was not arrested because he was associating with an-
other person; he was arrested because he and another person
were collaborating in conduct that was made criminal by the laws
of Georgia.27
The decisional paradigm, which is the most important of the
three, holds that individuals are entitled to "freedom to choose
how to conduct their lives." Certain rights are protected, Black-
mun observes, "because they form so central a part of an individ-
ual's life."'2 It is possible to derive, from "the freedom an individ-
ual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal
bonds,'O a right not to be discriminated against on the basis of
that protected choice.
The fact that a choice is important does not, however, mean
that it is protected. Otherwise there would be a constitutional
right to suicide, not just for terminally ill patients, but in all cir-
cumstances. The general right to autonomy in important deci-
sions does not necessarily entail a right to any particular option.
The common response to this argument is that gay relation-
ships are acceptable and valuable. When the law tries to interfere
or assign second-class status to gay people's sexual relationships,
it is harming those people for engaging in conduct that is innocu-
ous or even praiseworthy. Such laws are perverse and wrong.
Thus David Richards writes that "It]o deny the acceptability of
2 Id at 1446.
26 Hardwick, 478 US at 206 (Blackmun dissenting).
2' Richard Epstein would distinguish the conspiracy case by noting that conspiracies
have negative externalities. See Richard Epstein, Liberty, Equality, and Privacy: Choosing
a Legal Foundation for Gay Rights, 2002 U Chi Legal F 73, 98. This objection presupposes,
however, that negative externalities are the only possible justification for legal regulation.
Epstein can believe that, but as I shall argue below, that is not the classical position of
Anglo-American law.
Hardwick, 478 US at 205-06.
29 Id at 204.
30 Id at 205.
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such acts is itself a human evil, a denial of the distinctive human
capacities for loving and sensual experience without ulterior pro-
creative motives-in a plausible sense, itself unnatural."' Rich-
ards articulates the ultimate wellspring of the privacy argument,
denouncing laws that attempt to regulate homosexual sex as per-
nicious obstacles to human happiness.
As a moral argument, then, the autonomy argument is
sound. The trouble with this argument, when it is presented as a
constitutional argument, is the core difficulty with the privacy
doctrine: it requires judges to decide, with no apparent guidance
from any legal authority, what parts of an individual's life are so
central as to warrant protection. In another context, the Court
acknowledged that the question of what a person's "ultimate con-
cerns" are is basically a religious question.32 The courts have no
superior competence in answering such questions, which are
really not questions of law at all. The Court should not be making
pronouncements on such matters.
In short, because it is hard to determine the boundaries of
the right to privacy, it is hard to determine whether homosexual
sex is protected by that right. And so long as that is the case,
gays' constitutional privacy claims must be doubtful.
What then is one to think of the Hardwick decision? Many
commentators have suggested that Hardwick's claim cannot be
distinguished from those in earlier privacy cases.33 Professor Cass
Sunstein, in a nicely nuanced treatment, notes the difficulty of
the levels of generality problem, but suggests that it can be re-
solved by reference to precedent: "At the level of generality that
best explains such decisions as Roe and Griswold, the governing
tradition would require far stronger justifications than did the
Hardwick Court for criminal bans on sexual activity between
consenting adults."'
A close reading of the privacy cases indicates, however, that
they are less concerned with promoting sexual liberty than with
promoting social cohesion and deference to traditional institu-
31 David A. J. Richards, Sex, Drugs, Death, and the Law 41 (Rowman and Littlefield
1982).
32 United States v Seeger, 380 US 163, 180-187 (1965).
3 See, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr, Gaylaw: Challenging the Apartheid of
the Closet 152-56 (Harvard 1999); Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 15-21,
at 1421-35 (Foundation 2d ed 1988); Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick- Precedent
by Personal Predilection, 54 U Chi L Rev 648 (1987).
34 Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relation-
ship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U Chi L Rev 1161, 1173-74 (1988).
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tions. The decisions preceding Hardwick are not purely libertar-
ian in their tendency. The Court has rejected at least as often as
it has sustained privacy claims involving private conduct between
consenting adults. The majority in Griswold relied heavily on the
traditionally high status of marriage, and the concurring opinions
likewise embraced that tradition while rejecting sexual libertari-
anism." Eisenstadt v Baird36 extended the right of contraception
to unmarried couples while reaffirming that the state had a le-
gitimate interest in preventing fornication. 7 Roe specifically re-
jected the proposition "that one has an unlimited right to do with
one's body as one pleases."
A particularly striking illustration is a pair of cases, only
three years apart, in which the Court protected traditional fami-
lies from zoning laws, while withholding similar protection from
households made up of unrelated persons. 9 In short, the line of
cases preceding Hardwick suggested that sexual morals legisla-
tion was constitutionally legitimate, too many times for Hardwick
plausibly to be characterized as an anomaly in an otherwise liber-
tarian jurisprudence. Even the contraception and abortion cases
can be understood as concerned with social stability, which is
threatened by single-parent families, irresponsible youthful par-
ents, and neglected children.40
The principle of the privacy cases may simply be that in the
area of sexual conduct, regulations will be subject to heightened
scrutiny if they infringe on interests that judges deem to be im-
3' The concurring Justices indicated that the right to privacy did not cover such
things as adultery and homosexuality. See Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 498-99
(1965) (Goldberg concurring) (citing Poe v Ullman, 367 US 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan dis-
senting)); Id at 500 (Harlan concurring in the judgment) (citing his own dissent in Poe).
36 405 US at 450.
37 See id at 448.
Roe, 410 US at 154.
39 Compare Moore v City of East Cleveland, 431 US 494, 505-06 (1977) (finding un-
constitutional an ordinance that prohibited a woman from residing with her two grand-
sons, who were first cousins rather than siblings), with Village of Belle Terre v Boraas, 416
US 1, 9 (1974) (upholding an ordinance that prohibited persons unrelated by blood, mar-
riage, or adoption from living together).
40 See Thomas C. Grey, Eros, Civilization, and the Burger Court, 43 L & Contemp
Probs 83, 90 (Summer 1980). See also Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family,
1979 S Ct Rev 329. (I have not cited all the evidence that these writers compile, so the
skeptical reader should consult them.) The right to an abortion may also be derivable from
a right to bodily integrity, which may entail a right not to have one's body conscripted for
the state's purposes. See Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment
Defense of Abortion, 84 Nw U L Rev 480 (1990). A prohibition on conduct does not violate
that right when the prohibition does not itself imply a command to do anything in particu-
lar.
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portant. Once the judges decided that they had a low opinion of
"homosexual sodomy," that was the end of the matter. Hardwick
can, in short, be understood not as a constitutional anomaly, but
rather as a reflection of an authoritarian tendency that was pre-
sent in the privacy cases from the beginning. One can condemn
that tendency, as I do, but one cannot say that the result in
Hardwick is inconsistent with the preceding privacy case law.
The moralistic tendency of earlier case law is also the princi-
pal stumbling block to Professor Richard Epstein's approach to
the privacy cases, which starts from a premise that the constitu-
tion is libertarian" and then immediately collides with the well-
known nineteenth century rule that the police power includes the
power to protect public morals.42 Epstein claims that "[m]uch of
earlier morality on fornication, prostitution and homosexual ac-
tion was stirred by the inchoate fear that high levels of sexual
contact produced strongly negative social consequences-syphilis
and worse."3 But he later concedes that a "traditional lawyer"
would find relevant "the mere fact that homosexual conduct was
condemned in the Bible, and was widely regarded as an unnatu-
ral abomination." The prohibition of sodomy long precedes the
germ theory of disease, and I am aware of no evidence that any-
one before the late 20th century tried to justify the prohibition of
homosexual conduct on the basis of the kinds of externalities to
which Epstein would give weight."2 Equally dubious is Epstein's
41 A very dubious premise, since Epstein's conclusions are, as he admits, so widely at
variance with existing case law. Even if Epstein's reading of the Constitution's text were
plausible, modern constitutional law consists of more than just the document; it also in-
cludes the precedent that has developed around that document, which is why all modem
courses in constitutional law spend much more time on the doctrine than they do on the
document. See David Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi L Rev
877 (1996); Richard H. Fallon, Jr, Implementing the Constitution 111-26 (Harvard 2001).
Proposals to scrap large chunks of that case law therefore have a heavy burden of proof,
which Epstein has not attempted to meet, at least in his contribution to this symposium.
42 Epstein, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 73-74 (cited in note 27).
4 Id at 72.
Id at 101.
45 Nor can Epstein's externalities justify the prohibition of recreational drugs. Re-
sponding to the zonal prong of the privacy argument, Epstein notes that '[tihe dangers of
heroin use stem from the effects that it has on the user, not on the place where it is used."
Id at 97. But those dangers are primarily dangers to the user, not to third parties. Unlike,
say, alcohol, heroin does not make its users more likely to be violent or otherwise to vio-
late the rights of others. See Mark Kleiman, Against Excess: Drug Policy for Results 220,
362-63 (Basic 1992). Some heroin addicts steal to support their habits, but the high price
of heroin is entirely an artifact of illegality. The most cogent defenders of the prohibition
are frankly paternalistic. See James Q. Wilson, Against the Legalization of Drugs,
Commentary 21-28 (Feb 1990) (claiming that legalization will yield "a sharp increase in
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claim that changing knowledge of the mechanisms of disease
transmission is the reason "both social attitudes and legal norms"
concerning gays have changed." The changing status of gays
seems to have much more to do with the modern industrial divi-
sion of labor, which has made it possible to separate sexuality
from the imperative to procreate.4 ' Nineteenth century morals law
had little if anything to do with the containment of venereal dis-
ease; it prohibited fornication and prostitution, but also drunken-
ness, gambling, profanity, blasphemy, Sabbath-breaking, public
nudity, the hours of pubs, and many other things. Epstein's
characteristic method is first to figure out how the world logically
must be and then to look for evidence that it is that way. Here,
though, he seems to have skipped the second step.'
None of these observations can absolve the Court's opinion in
Hardwick, which is a disastrously bad piece of judicial crafts-
manship. Part of the problem may be that the task the Court set
itself is insoluble; there seems to be no principled way to draw the
boundaries of the privacy doctrine, so that one can have no more
confidence in the conclusion that Hardwick's conduct was not pro-
tected by the privacy right than that his conduct was protected.
Justice White worried that "[the Court is most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made con-
stitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language
or design of the Constitution.' The problem with this way of put-
ting matters, Rubenfeld observes, is that "the Court in Hardwick
necessarily drew a line: the right to privacy stops here. That act
use, a more widespread degradation of the human personality, and a greater rate of acci-
dents and violence").46 Epstein, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 94 (cited in note 27).
41 See John D'Emilio, Capitalism and Gay Identity, in Ann Snitow, ed, Powers of
Desire 100 (Monthly Review 1983).
" See generally William J. Novak, The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nine-
teenth-Century America 149-189 (North Carolina 1996). Epstein appears to be trying to
read the "morals" head out of the police power altogether, salvaging some exercises of it
under the heads of "health" and "safety."
49 I have said this before in the pages of this very journal, with specific reference to
Professor Epstein:
It is not inappropriate for a scholar to reason out the way the world must
be and then look for evidence showing that it is that way; it is hard to
imagine how else one can devise hypotheses and thus advance knowledge.
Sooner or later, though, one needs to test those hypotheses against evi-
dence.
Andrew Koppelman, Feminism and Libertarianism: A Response to Epstein, 1999 U Chi
Legal F 115, 120.
Hardwick, 478 US at 194.
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of line-drawing was a quintessentially normative judgment." '
That sort of judgment is, of course, the very kind of "imposition of
the Justices' own choice of values5 2 that Justice White sought to
avoid.
Moreover, the values on which the Court relies in Hardwick
are decidedly unappetizing. The central defect of the opinion is
what Blackmun called its "almost obsessive focus on homosexual
activity."' The statute upheld in Hardwick defined sodomy as "any
sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or
anus of another."" The category of homosexuality did not appear in
the statute. The record in the case did not even disclose the gender
of Hardwick's partner." The Court's declaration that "[tihe issue
presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a funda-
mental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy"' was thus
about as strange as if it had said that the issue presented was
whether persons with the initials M. H. had such a right. Whatever
the rational basis of the statute was, it could not have been, as the
Court claimed, the "belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia
that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable." Moreover,
when the Court tried to apply its test of whether the asserted lib-
erty was "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,"' it
looked to the traditional common law prohibition of sodomy, not
noticing that this definition did not differentiate between homo-
sexual and heterosexual sodomy, nor that the particular conduct
with which Hardwick was charged, fellatio, was not part of the
common law definition of sodomy." The Court anachronistically
assumed that the category of "homosexual" was part of the ancient
prohibition. Thus, the Court forcibly imposed the category of "ho-
mosexual" on the statute it was construing, the rationale for that
statute, and the scope of the constitutional privacy right.
Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv L Rev 737, 747 (1988).
Hardwick, 478 US at 191.
Id at 200 (Blackmun dissenting).
4 Quoted in id at 188 n 1 (opinion of the Court).
See Garrow, Liberty and Sexuality at 667 (cited in note 5).
'Hardwick, 478 US at 190.
17 Id at 196.
8 Id at 194.
59 See Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for
the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 Yale L J 1073, 1082-86 (1988). The
Court's bad history does not, however, itself demonstrate that Hardwick was wrongly
decided. An activity need not have been criminalized in the reign of Henry VIII, or in
1866, in order for the legislature to have discretion to criminalize it today.
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This would be poor craftsmanship under any circumstances,
but it was particularly disastrous where, as the Court well knew,60
there was an unsettled question about the status of anti-gay dis-
crimination under the Equal Protection Clause-a question that
the Court declared that it was not reaching. The Court's blithe
use of a category whose suspect character had not yet been adju-
dicated is so disastrously inappropriate as to cast a pall on Byron
White's entire judicial career. It is roughly analogous to a (thank-
fully imaginary) case in which a pre-Brown v Board of Education
court, upholding a conviction of an African-American defendant
for some crime of which race was no element, added in dicta that
it expressed no opinion as to whether the result would be differ-
ent if the defendant were white.
In sum, the privacy claim, often taken to be central to the
question of gays' constitutional status, is actually peripheral to
that question. A defense of constitutional protection for gays
must look elsewhere.
I will end by returning to the comparative question: Is the
sex discrimination argument, stated at the beginning of this arti-
cle, stronger or weaker than the privacy argument? As Epstein
observes, the sex discrimination argument is not free from inde-
terminacy. 1 With any presumptively unconstitutional law, the
question inevitably arises whether the state can offer an ade-
quate justification. Then courts must balance the interests in-
volved, which will unavoidably leave some room for judicial dis-
cretion. In the case of the sex discrimination argument, it is un-
certain what distinguishes sex discrimination in marriage from
similarly separate-but-equal discrimination in restrooms.2 On the
other hand, with the sex discrimination argument, the prima fa-
cie case has been made, and the burden is on the state to get out
from under it. The Court has held that "the party seeking to up-
60 See Rowland v Mad River School District, 470 US 1009 (1985) (Brennan, joined by
Marshall, dissenting from denial of certiorari).
61 Epstein, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 101-04 (cited in note 27).
62 For one attempt to explain what the distinction is, see Andrew Koppelman, The
Gay Rights Question in Contemporary American Law 57-59 (Chicago 2002). Epstein's
treatment of the marriage question is perhaps the strangest part of his article. He sug-
gests that states appropriately refuse to call same-sex relationships "marriages," because
doing this produces confusion analogous to that in trademark. See Epstein, 2002 U Chi
Legal F at 101 (cited in note 27). He does not explain what the confusion is. Unless the
state is entitled to decide that same-sex relationships are lower in quality or otherwise
different in kind than heterosexual relationships-and it is mysterious how, in his liber-
tarian universe, the state could possibly be entitled to decide that-then this argument is
not intelligible.
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hold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gen-
der must carry the burden of showing an 'exceedingly persuasive
justification' for the classification" and that "[tihe burden of jus-
tification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State." The
indeterminacy works, to that extent, to the advantage of the per-
son challenging the law.'
With privacy, on the other hand, the indeterminacy plagues
the plaintiff at the level of his prima facie case. The law's inertia
is in favor of validation. In short, it matters a lot at what stage of
the argument the indeterminacy comes in.63 By the time the inde-
terminacy of the sex discrimination argument comes into play,
the law is already presumptively unconstitutional. The privacy
argument is so indeterminate that it can barely get started.7
Mississippi University for Women v Hogan, 458 US 718, 724 (1982); see also United
States v Virginia, 518 US 515, 531 (1996).
6 518 US at 533.
65 The required shift in the burden of proof may, on the other hand, be troubling for
judges, who may have good political reasons for hesitating to impose full equality for gay
people with respect to such controversial rights as marriage. The comparative advantage
of the privacy right is that, because it is so unprincipled and ad hoc, judges may easily
shape it to suit their policy preferences or their political constraints.
This point was clarified in conversation with Professors Douglas Baird and Eric
Posner.
67 This claim only applies to the doctrine that has been crafted by the U.S. Supreme
Court and is the law in the contemporary United States. If the courts were to start over
from scratch and adopt what Epstein concedes is his "quirky, functional, non-traditional
view of the nature and the limits of the police power," Epstein, 2002 U Chi Legal F at 95
(cited in note 27), then neither the privacy nor the equal protection doctrine would be
indeterminate, and both would lead to a libertarian, "night-watchman state." Id at 77.
This is not, however, the world we actually inhabit. Epstein pays so little attention to
existing positive law that he never deigns to notice that sex discrimination is subject to
heightened scrutiny, and he therefore mistakenly thinks that gays' equal protection claim
is "rudderless." Id at 102.

